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In this article, a comparison is drawn between the role of good 
faith in the development of the Roman law of contract and the 
emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of 
contract. Firstly, it is shown how the Romans realised that their 
existing formal and rigid laws could not address the changing legal 
needs of the community due to the influx of foreigners (especially 
foreign traders) into Rome. In reaction to the changing commercial 
environment, they introduced flexible legal procedures and a more 
normative approach to these legal transactions to achieve fairness 
and justice between the contracting parties. This worked so well 
that the new flexible procedures and normative principles were 
transferred to the existing formalistic law. Gradually the existing 
ius civile became subject to a more normative interpretation in the 
interests of justice through the use of the open norm of good faith. 
It is argued that in a similar way, ubuntu can be used to address 
legal pluralism in the South African legal system, and its 
application as an underlying constitutional value could result in the 
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By understanding what is wrong, we may be able not only to understand our 
history, but also to shape it. If we lost something long ago which we have been 
unable to do without, we should try to remember what it was like. We should 
consider why it was so important.1 
1 Introduction: History as a narrative 
In Ancient Roman Lawyers, Tuori2 employs three examples to show how 
Roman law scholars interpret Roman historical sources to support their 
modern ideals. He explains that "[h]istory is not fiction, but the writing of 
history has some characteristics of creative writing",3 its fictional character 
being more pronounced where historical sources on a specific issue are in 
short supply.4 He concludes his book with the following question: 
Because facts are elusive in the light of the historical sources, all that remains 
are stories. But does the actualisation of legal history necessarily mean a 
distortion of history? If we imprint our ideals on the Romans, are we in fact any 
more talking about the Romans or ourselves? Because narration creates a story 
that gives meaning to fragmentary sources, is a story meaningful only when we 
can relate to it? Are the Romans of Roman legal history simply us, assembled 
in a historical togaparty?5 
In a study which investigates the possible harmonisation of good faith and 
ubuntu in the South African common law of contract, there is a real danger of 
imprinting the ideals of one concept onto the other. The historical sources on 
the development of good faith in Roman law are rare and incomplete, and 
some date from later historical periods (and are consequently already a 
product of historical interpretation).6 In a similar manner, due to the oral 
tradition in pre-colonial African jurisprudence,7 most of the written sources on 
ubuntu are relatively new in historical terms8 and the influence of colonialism 
                                            
  Hanri du Plessis. LLB LLM (UP) LLD (UNISA). Senior Lecturer, Department of Private 
Law, School of Law, University of South Africa (Unisa). E-mail: dplesh@unisa.ac.za. 
The article forms part of research undertaken during a period of research and 
development leave granted by Unisa in 2019. Parts of this article are also based on 
research forming part my unpublished thesis (Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu in 
South African Contract Law). The research for my thesis was funded by a grant from 
Unisa's Academic Qualification Improvement Programme from 2014 to 2017. Any 
opinions or conclusions expressed in this article are my own and Unisa does not 
accept any liability for them. Similarly, all errors remain my own. 
1  Gordley Philosophical Origins of Contract 9. 
2  Tuori Ancient Roman Lawyers. 
3  Tuori Ancient Roman Lawyers 181. Also see Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 29. 
4  Tuori Ancient Roman Lawyers 181. 
5  Tuori Ancient Roman Lawyers 193. 
6  For example, see the discussion dealing with the Law of the Twelve Tables in n 52 
below. 
7  For more detail on this aspect, see Bennett Customary Law 2-5. 
8  Gade 2011 S Afr J Philos 306, who states that the earliest written text he could find 
dates from 1846. 
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on these sources cannot be discounted.9 Does this mean that any attempt to 
compare their roles in legal development is doomed to fail? Or that such a 
comparison would be of no value in the development of modern legal ideals?  
Tuori10 argues that we use legal history as a self-reflective tool "to remind us 
where we come from" and that we use historical narratives to construct our 
identity. These narratives are essential to ensure a sense of belonging to a 
community. He maintains that dismissing these narratives as mere stories 
ignores their cultural significance and the role they play in our imagination.11 
Van der Walt12 proposes that the cultural significance of these stories in our 
modern law should be critically investigated. He specifically refers to the 
tradition in South African law of citing Roman rules as "universal and 
timeless" without considering the context within which these rules operated 
in Roman times.13 He argues that historical research should not aim to 
support or develop a legal doctrine but rather to understand the application 
of the Roman law rules in their specific context.14 Any historical investigation 
of Roman law should take cognisance of the political, social, economic and 
cultural context within which the Roman law rules operated and aim for "a 
reality dependent on the interpreter, who in turn, is conditioned by his legal 
and general cultural environment".15 Consequently, he argues that legal 
historical research in the South African context must be approached within 
the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) and should aim to provide alternative historical 
accounts of traditional private law concepts and ideas.16 Although he stresses 
that these alternative stories do not constitute "an uncontested or 'monolithic' 
view of what certain central rules or institutions of private law are", he argues 
that they can generate ideas about the role of law in societal transformation.17 
2 The research approach and structure of the articles 
A mere chronological discussion of the development of good faith in Roman 
contract law to its present role in the South African common law and ubuntu 
from its indigenous origins to its current role in South African contract law 
                                            
9  Pieterse "'Traditional' African Jurisprudence" 440-441; Bennett Customary Law 5-7. 
10  Tuori Ancient Roman Lawyers 191-192. 
11  Tuori Ancient Roman Lawyers 193. 
12  Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 30. 
13  Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 32. 
14  Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 33. 
15  Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 33. 
16  Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 36. 
17  Van der Walt 2006 Fundamina 36. 
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would not provide a meaningful story about these concepts. Burckhardt18 
points out that "it may be right to begin at the beginning in any kind of study, 
but not in history". Rather, it should be considered where and why these 
concepts have been linked with modern law and what part of their legal 
history could throw more light on modern legal ideals. For that reason, this 
article starts with the contemporary ideas that will guide the interpretation of 
the legal historical sources, and as pointed out by Van der Walt above, these 
refer to the ideals of South Africa's new constitutional order. The 
Constitutional Court decisions of Barkhuizen v Napier,19 Everfresh Market 
Virginia v Shoprite Checkers20 and Botha v Rich21 are discussed as they 
provide good illustrations of the constitutional ideal of harmonising the 
concepts of good faith and ubuntu in the South African common law of 
contract.  
In Barkhuizen v Napier the Constitutional Court considered the role that good 
faith and ubuntu could play in the development of the common law of 
contract. First the Court held that public policy implicates notions of fairness, 
justice, equity and reasonableness, and as such, it must take into account 
the principle of "simple justice between man and man".22 Lubbe23 linked this 
notion with good faith and it would seem that the Court also makes this link, 
because later in the judgment it states that good faith refers to "justice, 
reasonableness and fairness".24 However, instead of linking the notion of 
"simple justice between man and man" with good faith the Court explicitly 
links it with ubuntu.25 Therefore, it seems that the Court is of the view that 
both notions refer to justice, fairness and reasonableness and can be 
incorporated under the policy consideration of simple justice between man 
and man. 
In Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers, the Constitutional Court 
stressed the importance of good faith in the law of contract and the urgency 
and importance of determining its role in a constitutional framework.26 The 
Court also emphasised the importance of ubuntu in determining the spirit, 
                                            
18  As quoted by Schulz Principles of Roman Law 4. 
19  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) (hereafter Barkhuizen v Napier). 
20  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) 
(hereafter Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers). 
21  Botha v Rich 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) (hereafter Botha v Rich). 
22  Barkhuizen v Napier para 51. 
23  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20. 
24  Barkhuizen v Napier para 80. 
25  Barkhuizen v Napier para 51. 
26  Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers para 77 (majority) and para 22 
(minority). See also Barkhuizen v Napier para 82. 
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purport and objects of the Constitution.27 In his minority judgment, Justice 
Yacoob28 made the following statement: 
The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of ubuntu are also 
relevant in the process of determining the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution. The development of our economy and contract law has thus far 
predominantly been shaped by colonial legal tradition represented by English 
law, Roman law and Roman Dutch law. The common law of contract regulates 
the environment within which trade and commerce takes place. Its development 
should take cognisance of the values of the vast majority of people who are now 
able to take part without hindrance in trade and commerce. And it may well be 
that the approach of the majority of people in our country place a higher value 
on negotiating in good faith than would otherwise have been the case. Contract 
law cannot confine itself to colonial legal tradition alone. 
These statements imply that ubuntu and good faith are not so far removed 
from each other and that they may be based on the same or similar values. 
In addition, Justice Yacoob is of the view that the Constitution may require 
more emphasis on these values than is found in the common law of contract 
currently, due to a shift in the legal convictions of the community, which 
requires a greater concern for contractual justice.29  
As the law stands today, good faith is not an independent rule that can be 
used to strike down a contract due to unfairness but operates as an 
underlying principle that finds expression through existing doctrines and rules 
in the law of contract.30 However, the Constitutional Court in Botha v Rich 
showed a willingness to use the principle of good faith in a more flexible 
manner to counter any injustice resulting from the rigid application of the 
existing rules and doctrines of the common law of contract and to prevent the 
unfair enforcement of a contract term.31 Although the Court did not refer to 
the concept of ubuntu expressly, it will be argued that its application of the 
principle of good faith is a step forward in developing the concept of good 
                                            
27  Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers para 71 (majority) and para 23 
(minority). 
28  Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers para 23. 
29  Also see Louw 2013 PELJ 66. This shift in the legal convictions of the community is 
also reflected in the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, which has introduced 
measures to promote contractual fairness in contracts governed by the Act (especially 
s 48). The scope and application of the Act falls outside the scope of this article. 
30  As re-iterated by the Supreme Court of Appeal on numerous occasions: Potgieter v 
Potgieter 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) paras 32-34; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 
(Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) para 23-24; African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd 
v Dreams Travel and Tours CC 2011 3 SA 511 (SCA) para 28; South African Forestry 
Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) paras 26-31; Afrox Healthcare Bpk 
v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 32; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 
22. The Constitutional Court has questioned the limited role of good faith obiter 
(Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers para 77 (majority) and para 22 
(minority); Barkhuizen v Napier para 82. 
31  Botha v Rich para 45 read with para 51.  
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faith in accordance with the ideals of ubuntu as an underlying constitutional 
value.32 Cornell and Fuller33 argue that since ubuntu requires that justice 
should be done between individuals, good faith should develop from an 
abstract value underlying the substantive law of contract into an independent 
substantive rule that can be used to strike down an unfair contract term that 
would otherwise be enforceable. To date, ubuntu has not been applied in this 
way, but it is the possible future story the Constitutional Court envisages for 
ubuntu and by implication good faith.34  
Once upon a time, good faith (bona fides) played a prominent role in ensuring 
contractual fairness in Roman law: 
During the later Republic, the expansion of the Roman power in the 
Mediterranean world and the social and economic changes by which it was 
accompanied had a profound effect on the character and development of 
Roman law. By the end of this period the old system of law had partly been 
abolished or changed in such a way that its scope was extended to meet the 
needs of a complex and highly sophisticated society. It was in response to 
changed social, economic and political conditions that Roman law broke 
through the barrier of formalism, was secularised and internationalised, and 
from a system that was strictly and often unjustly applied, became a highly 
developed system marked by its flexibility and adaptability to new and changing 
conditions.35 
In fact, Schermaier36 argues that the story of good faith in Roman law is the 
first illustration of how "equitable ideas" can revolutionise a legal system. 
Furthermore, by investigating the principles underlying the Roman law of 
contract in their greater historical context, Roman law "can offer solutions, or 
at least give assistance for the solution, of modern legal problems".37 
Therefore, the aim is to investigate the introduction and development of good 
faith (bona fides) in the Roman law of contract in a way that informs the 
emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract.  
Four themes are explored in order to construct a more contextual legal history 
of good faith in Roman contract law and compare this history with the 
emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract today. 
These themes are:  
                                            
32  See Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 14-19. 
33  Cornell and Muvangua "Introduction" 24. 
34  Contra the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the recent case of Mohamed's 
Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 314 
(SCA). 
35  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 181.  
36  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 65. 
37  Erasmus 1989 SALJ 677 quoting Beinart 1971 Acta Juridica 140. 
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(a) addressing legal pluralism; 
(b) using open norms38 to supplement and correct the existing law;  
(c) harmonising values from different legal systems; and 
(d) concretising open norms intended to realise contractual justice. 
The first two themes are investigated in this article while the remaining two 
themes are examined in a further article39 which also contains the final 
conclusion. Each theme is explored with reference to the introduction and 
development of good faith in the Roman law of contract40 where after a 
comparison is then drawn with the emerging role of ubuntu in the South 
African common law of contract. 
Furthermore, as this investigation relates to the future role of ubuntu in the 
common law of contract, the focus will be on the concept of ubuntu in its 
modern appearance. As Pieterse41 explains: 
[A] return to its [ubuntu's] pre-colonial state is neither practically nor 
ideologically feasible. Yet, certain of the values underlying pre-colonial thinking 
still reverberate through contemporary African society. Through engaging with 
these values, in their contemporary manifestations, a view emerges of law and 
society that might prove useful… 
Finally, Himonga42 argues that the best approach to determining the possible 
future role of ubuntu in law is to focus on the judicial descriptions of ubuntu 
as found in South African law. Therefore, both articles focus on the legal 
description of ubuntu as found in the decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
                                            
38  Open norms are rules or standards that have no fixed or restricted meaning, can apply 
to various factual situations and enable value judgments (Bennett, Munro and Jacobs 
Ubuntu 30; Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 300-301; Bhana and Pieterse 2005 SALJ 
868). Bennett, Munro and Jacobs Ubuntu 61 also use the term "metanorm", which 
they define as a term "of a higher order". Such norms "do not apply directly to the facts 
of cases" but rather "regulate the application of lower order rules to bring about more 
equitable results." 
39  Du Plessis 2019 PELJ. 
40  These sections consist mostly of the traditional account of the development of bona 
fides as found in standard Roman law sources. As a detailed study of Roman law no 
longer forms part of the law curriculum in South Africa, it was considered necessary 
to provide a detailed overview of the development of bona fides in both articles. 
41  Pieterse "'Traditional' African Jurisprudence" 439. 
42  Himonga "Exploring the Concept of Ubuntu" 2. Also see Bennett, Munro and Jacobs 
Ubuntu 31. 
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3 Addressing legal pluralism 
3.1 The role of good faith in addressing legal pluralism in Rome 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The exact age and origin of the bonae fidei actions are unknown and 
contested.43 The generally accepted theory is that these actions were 
introduced by the peregrine praetor, who had jurisdiction over disputes 
between foreigners.44 This suggests that bona fides played an important role 
in dealing with legal pluralism in Rome and it is this idea that is explored here. 
First though, some historical context of the pre-existing Roman law is 
necessary to understand where the bonae fidei actions fit into the greater 
Roman law history. 
3.1.2  An historical overview of the ius civile 
For the purposes of this investigation, the story of the ius civile starts in the 
early republic of Rome.45 Prior to this period Rome was a monarchy, until 509 
BC when the king was expelled from Rome.46 The early republic was 
characterised by the struggle of the orders between the patricians and the 
plebeians.47 In the early republic, private law was based on customs more 
than legislation48 and all state affairs were managed by two consuls selected 
annually from the patrician class.49 As a result, the patricians controlled the 
                                            
43  Schermaier and Dedek "Bona Fides" 1155; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman 
Contract Law" 68.  
44  Schermaier and Dedek "Bona Fides" 1155; Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 266; 
De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 167. 
45  The Republican period was from 510 BC to 27 BC (Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman 
Law xii).  
46  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 11; Watson Law of the Ancient 
Romans 3. This period (753 BC to 510 BC) is commonly referred to as the Monarchy 
or the period of the kings (Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law xii). The founding date 
of Rome is traditionally cited as 753 BC (Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law 
para 6). 
47  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 19. Roman society was hierarchical 
in nature. The patricians (partricii) were the Roman aristocracy who possessed the 
most power and riches and constituted the minority of the population. In the early 
republic, the most important positions were filled by persons from the patrician class. 
The plebeians (plebeii) were the underprivileged and poor masses who were subject 
to the political and economic power exerted by the patricians. See Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman Civil Law para 19. 
48  D 1 2 2 3 Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book states that the law at the beginning of the 
Roman republic worked "with customs of a sort rather than with legislation" (quoted 
from Watson Digest of Justinian). Also see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil 
Law para 9. 
49  D 1 2 2 3 Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book: "Then, after the ejection of the kings, it was 
established that there be two consuls in whom a statute laid down that the supreme 
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content and administration of the law.50 A major grievance of the plebeians 
was that they wanted the existing law to be made public so that they could 
have better access to justice.51 Consequently, one of the results of the 
struggle of the orders was the law of the Twelve Tables.52 The law of the 
Twelve Tables dealt with private, public and sacral law with specific focus on 
the prescribed procedures.53 Although it constituted a publication of the 
existing law rather than new rules,54 later Romans viewed this law as the 
source and origin of all Roman law, and in conjunction with the interpretations 
given to it by the pontiffs (and later the jurists), it comprised the ius civile.55 
                                            
authority should be vested" (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian). Consuls 
(consules) were initially known as preators (praetores). Also see Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman Civil Law para 11.  
50  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 118-119. 
51  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 118-119; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman Civil Law para 26. 
52  A history of the introduction of the Law of the Twelve Tables is given in D 1 2 2 4, 
Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book: "… it was decided that there be appointed, on the 
authority of the people, a commission of ten men by whom were to be studied the laws 
of the Greek city states and by whom their own city was to be endowed with laws. 
They wrote out the laws in full on ivory tablets and put the tablets together in front of 
the rostra, to make the laws all the more open to inspection. They were given during 
that year sovereign rights in the civitas, to enable them to correct the laws, if there 
should be a need for that, and to interpret them without liability to any appeal such as 
lay from the rest of the magistracy. They themselves discovered a deficiency in that 
first batch of laws, and accordingly, the added two tablets to the original set. It was 
from this addition that the laws of the Twelve Tables got their name" (quoted from 
Watson Digest of Justinian). Also see Kaser Roman Private Law 15; Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman Civil Law paras 27-29. It is estimated that the Law of the Twelve 
Tables was introduced between 451 and 449 BC (Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
Civil Law para 27). No original copy has survived but a modern English compilation 
can be found in Johnson et al. Ancient Roman Statutes doc 8. 
53  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 121. The first three tables dealt with 
procedural issues, which indicates that procedure was important to the Romans (Du 
Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 31). 
54  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 121; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
Civil Law para 27. 
55  D 1 2 2 6 Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book: "Then about the same time actions-at-law 
whereby people could litigate among themselves were composed out of these statutes 
[the laws of the Twelve Tables]. To prevent the citizenry from initiating litigation any 
old how, the lawmakers' will was that the actions-at-law be in fixed and solemn terms. 
This branch of-law has the name legis actiones, that is, statutory actions-at-law. And 
so these three branches of law came into being at almost the same time: once the 
statute law of the Twelve Tables was passed, the jus civile started to emerge from 
them, and legis actiones were put together from the same source. In relation to all 
these statutes, however, knowledge of their authoritative interpretation and conduct of 
the actions at law belonged to the College of Priests, one of whom was appointed 
each year to preside over private matters" (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian). 
Also see Kaser Roman Private Law 18, 31; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil 
Law para 9. 
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The ius civile was strict, rigid and formalistic in nature.56 Gaius57 explains as 
follows: 
The actions of the practice of older times were called legis actiones, either 
because they were the creation of statutes … or because they were framed in 
the very words of statutes and were consequently treated as no less immutable 
than statutes. Hence it was held that a man who, when suing for the cutting 
down of his vines, had used the word ‘vines’, had lost his claim, because he 
ought to have said ‘trees’, seeing that the law of the Twelve Tables, on which 
his action for the cutting down of his vines lay, spoke of cutting down trees in 
general.  
As demonstrated by the above example, the formulas of the legis actiones 
(based on specific combinations of spoken words and gestures) had to be 
followed exactly and any deviation, however slight, would result in the 
rejection of the claim.58 More importantly, the ius civile only applied where 
both parties to the dispute were Roman citizens.59  
As already mentioned, the content and administration of the law was 
controlled by the patricians as the consuls were appointed from the patrician 
class. In 367 BC, the leges Liciniae Sextiae were passed in terms of which 
one of the consuls had to be appointed from the plebeian class and this was 
a further victory for the plebeians in the struggle of the orders.60 Another 
consequence of the leges Liciniae Sextiae was the creation of the office of 
the praetor who was later referred to as the urban praetor (praetor urbanus).61 
                                            
56  Kaser Roman Private Law 43; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law paras 10, 
24. 
57  Gaius Inst 4 11 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I). Also see Gaius 
Inst 4 30, where he states that "the excessive technicality of the early makers of the 
law was carried so far that a party who made the slightest mistake lost his case" 
(quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I). 
58  Kaser Roman Private Law 43, 392; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 
717. For more detail on the legis actio procedure see Van Warmelo Oorsprong van 
die Romeinse Reg para 84ff. 
59  In Gaius Inst 1 1 it is said that the "law which a people establishes for itself is peculiar 
to it, and is called ius ciuile (civil law) as being the special law of that ciuitas (State)" 
(quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I); cf D 1 1 9, Gaius, Institutes, Book 
1, where it is stated that "law which each nation has set up as a law unto itself is 
special to that particular civitas and is called jus civile, civil law, as being that which is 
proper to the particular civil society (civitas)" (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian). 
Also see Kaser Roman Private Law 19, 392; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 12. 
However, there were exceptions to this rule, which are discussed in n 73 below. 
60  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 84; Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 
402.  
61  D 1 2 2 27, Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book: "And when the consuls were being called 
away to the wars with neighbouring peoples, and there was no one in the civitas 
empowered to attend to legal business in the city, what was done was that a praetor 
also was created, called the urban praetor on the ground that he exercised jurisdiction 
within the city" (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian). Also see Van Warmelo 
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The urban praetor took over the duties of the consuls in respect of the 
administration of civil disputes between Roman citizens.62 He was elected 
annually and invested with extensive powers (imperium)63 which enabled him 
to regulate legal proceedings.64 He would issue his annual edict at the 
beginning of his office term65 which set out the rules and procedures that 
would be followed to resolve private law disputes during his term in office.66 
He also had the right to grant a new remedy during his year in office if he 
thought it necessary.67 He further had to ensure that the dispute between the 
parties was formulated correctly, after which he had to appoint a judge (iudex) 
to adjudicate the dispute.68 The urban praetor's edict was based upon the 
existing ius civile and consequently contained remedies based on the strict 
and formal legis actiones.69 These actions are referred to as the stricti iuris 
(strict law) actions.70 
3.1.3 The development of the ius honorarium by the peregrine praetor 
During the third century BC the number of foreigners (peregrini)71 living in 
Rome increased dramatically, which resulted in a rise in business 
transactions between Roman citizens and foreigners.72 These foreigners 
                                            
Principles of Roman Civil Law para 14; Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 403. For a 
detailed discussion on the creation of the praetorship see Brennan Praetorship ch 3. 
62  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 30; Schiller Roman Law 
Mechanisms 411. 
63  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 15. 
64  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 30; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius 
Part II 17. 
65  Gaius Inst 1 6, where it is stated that "[t]he right of issuing edicts is possessed by 
magistrates of the Roman people" (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I). 
66  D 1 2 2 10, Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book: "At the same time, the magistrates also 
were settling matters of legal right, and in order to let the citizens know and allow for 
the jurisdiction which each magistrate would be exercising over any given matter, they 
took to publishing edicts. These edicts, in the case of the praetors, constituted the jus 
honorarium (honorary law): 'honorary' is the term used, because the law in question 
had come from the high honor of praetorian office" (quoted from Watson Digest of 
Justinian). Also see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 31; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius Part II 18. 
67  Kaser Roman Private Law 20.  
68  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 30. 
69  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 72; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman Civil Law para 31. 
70 Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 256; Kaser Roman Private Law 174. 
71  The term peregrini refers to freemen (as opposed to slaves) who were not Roman 
citizens (Roby Roman Private Law Vol 1 19). 
72  D 1 2 2 28, Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book: "Some years thereafter that single praetor 
became insufficient, because a great crowd of foreigners had come into the civitas as 
well, and so another praetor was established, who got the name peregrine praetor, 
because he mainly exercised jurisdiction as between foreigners (peregrini)" (quoted 
from Watson Digest of Justinian). Also see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil 
Law para 14; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 12. 
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could not institute any of the legis actiones because the ius civile was 
available to Roman citizens only.73 This meant, for the most part, that 
foreigners residing in Rome could not take part in legal transactions or 
institute any legal proceedings.74 To address this situation, an additional 
praetor, called the peregrine praetor (praetor peregrinus) was appointed in 
242 BC75 to administer civil disputes where foreigners were involved.76 
However, where the urban praetor applied the formal and strict ius civile 
between Roman citizens, the same could not prevail in the peregrine 
praetor's forum.77 Many of the foreigners in Rome were traders and their 
disputes resulted from their commercial dealings with each other and with 
Roman citizens.78 A more informal and effective procedure was required to 
deal with these commercial transactions, which were governed by informal 
                                            
73  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 34; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract 
Law" 77; Kaser Roman Private Law 32. There were exceptions to this rule. For 
example, where a person was granted commercium (ie the capacity to conclude 
certain Roman transactions) or conubium (the capacity to contract a marriage which 
was valid under the ius civile) (Kaser Roman Private Law 31). As a further example, 
a fiction of Roman citizenship could be attributed to a foreigner, specifically in the case 
of the actio furti (action for theft) and the actio legis Aquiliae (action for wrongful 
damage) (Gaius Inst 4 37; Kaser Roman Private Law 33).  
74  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 186. 
75  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 14; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius 
Part II 17. Although most sources cite 242 BC as the year the peregrine praetor was 
introduced, this remains a contentious issue (see Brennan Praetorship 85-89). 
76  D 1 2 2 28, Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book (quoted in n 72 above). Also see Du 
Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 33; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 
14; Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 403. The exact jurisdiction of the peregrine 
praetor is uncertain (Watson Law of the Ancient Romans 23-24). First, there is a 
difference of opinion whether the jurisdictions of the two praetors were based on the 
status of the parties or convenience (see Bablitz Actors and Audience 206 n 4, 210 n 
71; Brennan Praetorship 85-89, 461-462; Gilbert 1939 Res Judicatae 50-58). 
Secondly, if the first view is preferred there is a difference of opinion whether the 
peregrine praetor had jurisdiction over disputes between foreigners as well as disputes 
between Roman citizens and foreigners from the start. Daube argues that initially the 
peregrine praetor had jurisdiction over disputes between foreigners only, which 
jurisdiction was later expanded to include disputes between foreigners and citizens 
(Daube 1951 Journal of Roman Studies 66-70 supported by Watson 1962 Rev Int'le 
Droits Ant 431 n 2). Despite Daube's argument, it is generally accepted that the 
peregrine praetor's jurisdiction included disputes between foreigners as well as 
disputes between Roman citizens and foreigners from the start (see Brennan 
Praetorship 133-134; and Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 403 for a summary of the 
criticisms raised against Daube's view).  
77  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 34. 
78  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 72; Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman 
Law 87-88, 198. 
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trade usages and customs.79 Powell80 explains that the existing Roman law 
remedies were not accessible or suitable for use by foreigners: 
The parties to these old actions had to define the issue between them in a 
precise form of words, in Latin, and sometimes with oaths invoking the Roman 
gods. That was all very well for Roman citizens who spoke Latin and who 
worshipped the Roman gods. But it meant a complete denial of justice to the 
foreigner whose Latin was non-existent or imperfect and upon whom the Roman 
religion was not binding. 
This resulted in the development of the formulary (per formulam) procedure81 
by the peregrine praetor.82 The formulary procedure was characterised by "its 
simplicity, economy, and adaptability".83 As in the legis actiones procedure, 
the parties had to formulate their claim before the praetor, who appointed a 
judge once he was satisfied with the formula.84 However, while the formulas 
of the legis actiones consisted of spoken words and gestures that had to be 
followed exactly, the formulary procedure required that the dispute between 
the parties be reduced to writing, which meant that the parties did not need 
to follow formal words and rituals in setting out their claims.85 Through this 
flexibility, the peregrine praetor obtained a large discretion to influence the 
law.86 This influence was indirect, as the praetor had no legislative powers 
and could not introduce new legal rights.87 However, the praetor was 
responsible for setting out the legal procedures for the administration of 
justice in his edict, and as a result, he had the power to introduce new 
remedies.88 The new body of rules that emerged from the peregrine praetor's 
                                            
79  Powell 1956 CLP 19. Also see Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 72; Schermaier 
"Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 73. 
80  Powell 1956 CLP 19. 
81  The introduction date of the formulary procedure is uncertain (Nicholas Introduction to 
Roman Law 20). However, Birks 1969 Irish Jurist 357 proposes that the formulary 
procedure predates the introduction of the peregrine praetor in 242 BC (see further n 
82 below).  
82  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 34; Kaser Roman Private Law 19, 395; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 726; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part 
II 252-253. Birks 1969 Irish Jurist 357 proposes that the formulary procedure was 
developed by the urban praetor. Again, this is a contentious issue (see Brennan 
Praetorship 134-135; Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 405). 
83  Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 20. See Kaser Roman Private Law 401ff for a 
discussion on how the formulary procedure worked. See further Schulz Roman Legal 
Science 50-51 on the flexibility of the formulary procedure. 
84  Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse Reg para 92. 
85  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law 
para 727. For a detailed discussion of how the formulary procedure worked in practice 
see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 728ff. 
86  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law 
para 727. 
87  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 185, 199. 
88  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 74; Schulz Roman Legal Science 
50. 
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edict became known as the ius honorarium or ius praetorium.89 These rules 
took account of the customs which governed commercial dealings with 
foreigners,90 were "based largely on common sense, expediency and 
fairness", and became known as the ius gentium.91  
It is possible that the bonae fidei iudiciae (bona fide actions) were 
introduced92 in the peregrine praetor's edict.93 The most well-known bonae 
fidei contracts are the consensual contracts, namely sale (emptio venditio), 
letting and hiring (locatio conductio), mandate (mandatum) and partnership 
(societas).94 These contracts required no formalities and their validity was 
based on the agreement (consensus) between the parties.95 The formulae of 
the bona fide actions included a clause at the end of the formula instructing 
the judge to decide the case according to what the defendant ought to do or 
give "ex fide bona" (in good faith).96 Hence the judge had to decide the case 
                                            
89  D 1 1 7 1, Papinian, Definitions, Book 2: "Praetorian law (jus praetorium) is that which 
in the public interest the praetors have introduced in aid or supplementation or 
correction of the jus civile. This is also called honorary law (jus honorarium), being so 
named for the high office (honos) of the praetors" (quoted from Watson Digest of 
Justinian); D 1 2 2 10, Pomponius, Manual, Sole Book (quoted in n 66 above). See 
further Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 187. For a contrary view see 
Watson Law Making 64ff, who argues that the ius honorarium mainly derived from the 
urban praetor's edict. 
90  Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 528 sv "Ius gentium". 
91  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 186. Also see Kaser Roman Private 
Law 32; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law paras 25, 82. 
92  There is uncertainty as to when the bona fide iudiciae emerged (see a summary of the 
various arguments in Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 71-72). 
93  Schermaier and Dedek "Bona Fides" 1155; Kaser Roman Private Law 19; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius Part II 253, 167. This is a departure from Schermaier's earlier view 
(see Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 77). Other scholars argue that 
the bonae fidei iudiciae is the work of the urban praetor (Watson 1984 LHR 10ff; 
Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 422). This remains a contentious issue (Schiller 
Roman Law Mechanisms 527-530). The answer to this question is not vital to the 
arguments contained in this article as it is generally accepted that the development of 
the ius honorarium was in part due to the expansion of Rome, the influx of foreigners 
into the city and the subsequent increase in foreign trade (Mousourakis Historical 
Context of Roman Law 181; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 25). 
94  Gaius Inst 3 135: "Obligations are created by consent in sale, hire, partnership, and 
mandate" (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I); cf Just Inst 3 22: 
"Consensual obligations arise in sales (emptio venditio), letting and hirings (locatio 
conductio), partnerships (societas) and mandates (mandata)" (quoted from Thomas 
Institutes of Justinian).  
95  Gaius Inst 3 136: "The reason why we say that in these cases the obligations are 
contracted by consent is that no formality whether of words or writing is required, but 
it is enough that the persons dealing have consented" (quoted from De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius Part I). Also see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 
441. 
96  Du Plessis Borkowski's Roman Law 263; Kaser Roman Private Law 174; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 441.  
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on the basis of the principle of good faith.97 Gaius98 explains that "the iudex 
appears to be allowed complete discretion in assessing, on the bases of 
justice and equity, how much ought to be made good to the plaintiff". In this 
context, good faith referred to honesty and fairness,99 which in turn denoted 
an objective and ethical standard of behaviour that was expected from the 
parties.100  
It can thus be concluded that good faith played an important role in 
addressing the changing political, social and economic environment in Rome. 
The Romans showed an exceptional ability to deal with the changing 
environment by developing a separate flexible and fair legal system to govern 
legal transactions between Romans and foreigners. As will be seen below, it 
did not take long before these flexible procedures and normative principles 
were incorporated into the existing ius civile.101 
3.2 The role of ubuntu in addressing legal pluralism in South Africa 
The South African story of legal pluralism is still in the making and relatively 
new compared to the Roman one. South Africa is characterised by a 
multicultural and multiracial society in which different legal systems have 
been observed over a long period of time.102 However, these different legal 
systems did not always have equal status under the official law. It is peculiar, 
but due to the South African history of colonialism and apartheid, that the 
term "common law" in South African law refers to the system of law based on 
Roman-Dutch and English law that was imported to South Africa under 
colonial rule and which was developed by legislation and legal precedents 
over time.103 As such, the term "common law" does not include the 
indigenous legal systems collectively referred to as customary law, which are 
                                            
97  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 21; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman 
Contract Law" 77; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 441.  
98  Gaius Inst 4 61 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I). 
99  Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 374 sv "Bona Fides".  
100  Gaius Inst 3 137: "Further, in these contracts [consensual contracts] the parties are 
reciprocally liable for what each is bound in fairness and equity to perform for the 
other…" (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I); D 16 3 31pr where it is 
stated that "[t]he good faith that is required in contracts calls for level dealing in the 
highest degree" (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian). See further Földi 2014 
Fundamina 318 n 37; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 394. 
101  See the discussion in para 4.1 below. 
102 Bekker, Rautenbach and Tshivhase "Nature of African Customary Law" 19. 
103  Bennett Customary Law 35 n 2. 
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followed by the majority of the population who are regarded as the indigenous 
peoples of South Africa.104 
Before the adoption of the Constitution, customary laws in South Africa were 
treated as inferior to the common law.105 Where customary laws were 
recognised they were usually subject to a repugnancy clause. This meant 
that customary laws were applied as far as they were not repugnant to the 
principles and public policy of natural justice,106 which in turn were shaped by 
common law ideals.107 Bennet108 argues that this resulted in the common law 
influencing the customary law, but no such influence was exercised by 
customary law on the common law in return. This situation was compounded 
by the conservative legal culture that was prevalent under apartheid, and 
which Keep and Midgley109 describe as "conservative and positivist, with 
judicial deference to the executive and to parliamentary sovereignty; 
formalistic, technical and authoritarian; and 'of reasoned argument' and 
justification". 
With the abolition of apartheid and the advent of the new constitutional order, 
customary law was finally recognised as a separate legal system with the 
same status as that of common law.110 However, this does not mean that 
customary law is treated like common law. Rautenbach111 refers to a number 
of examples to conclude that where common law and customary law are 
harmonised, such harmonisation takes place "within a framework of Western 
values". In addition, customary law is seen through the lens of common law 
rules and values, but the common law is rarely assessed from the viewpoint 
of customary rules and values. Keep and Midgley112 refer to this dichotomy 
as a failure to develop a legal culture that reflects customary values. They 
                                            
104  Rautenbach "Phenomenon of Legal Pluralism" 12 n 52. This is the preferred term 
although the term "indigenous law" has also been used (Bennett Customary Law 34 n 
2). 
105  Bekker, Rautenbach and Tshivhase "Nature of African Customary Law" 19. 
106  Bennett 2011 PELJ 30 referring to s 1(1) of the current Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988 and s 11(1) of the partly repealed Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
Also see Thomas 2008 Fundamina 141, referring to older statutes in this respect.  
107  Bekker, Rautenbach and Tshivhase "Nature of African Customary Law" 19. 
108  Bennett 2011 PELJ 30. Also see Bennett, Munro and Jacobs Ubuntu 5. 
109  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 29. Also see Van der Walt 2006 
Fundamina 17-29; Klare 1998 SAJHR 168-172. 
110  Sections 39(3) and 211(3) of the Constitution; Gumede v The President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) para 22, in which the Court confirmed 
that the customary law "lives side by side with the common law and legislation".  
111  Rautenbach "Phenomenon of Legal Pluralism" 13. 
112  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 48 as supported by Himonga, 
Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 370. 
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further argue that a cohesive and plural legal culture is necessary in order to 
legitimise the new legal system in South Africa.113 
The South African common law of contract follows a similar pattern. The 
classical model of contract law based on freedom and sanctity of contract114 
has been followed for a long time.115 Freedom of contract entails that the 
parties can decide whether, with whom and on what terms to contract, which 
finds expression through consensus.116 This leads to the principle of the 
sanctity of contract, which refers to the idea that where a contract was 
entered into freely and where the terms thereof are not contrary to public 
policy it should be enforced.117 As explained by Adams and Brownsword:118 
According to the classical view, the social function of contract is not simply to 
facilitate exchange: contract is a vehicle for maximising economic self-interest. 
Contractors may legitimately pursue their own interests, prioritising their own 
interests against those of the other side, subject only to such minimal 
constraints as those pertaining to fraud and coercion. 
Accordingly, it promotes an individualistic approach to contracts that is based 
on the philosophies of individualism and economic liberalism119 which were 
imported from English law during the nineteenth century.120 
The classical approach to contract law assumes that the contracting parties 
are in an equal bargaining position and therefore promotes formal equality.121 
As Hawthorne explains: 
                                            
113  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 48 as supported by Himonga, 
Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 370; Rautenbach "Exploring the Contribution of Ubuntu" 
309. Also see the Preamble of the Constitution, where it is stated that "South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity". Also see Bennett, Munro and 
Jacobs Ubuntu 1. 
114  Zimmerman "Good Faith and Equity" 551, referring to the famous quote by Sir Jessel 
MR in the English case of Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 
1875 LR 19 Eq 462 465: "[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice". 
115  The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has also referred with approval to the 
quote in n 114 above (see eg Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9). 
116  Hutchison "Nature and Basis of Contract" 24; Bhana and Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
117  Hutchison "Nature and Basis of Contract" 24; Bhana and Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; 
Zimmerman Law of Obligations 576-577. 
118  Adams and Brownsword Key Issues in Contract as quoted by Hawthorne 2012 
THRHR 348 n 11. 
119  Hutchison "Nature and Basis of Contract" 24; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76; 
Zimmerman Law of Obligations 577.  
120  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137.  
121  Hutchison "Nature and Basis of Contract" 23-24; Bhana and Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
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Both classical contract law and the classical conception of the rule of law have 
as their point of departure that inequality between individuals is the result of 
natural differences and capabilities and that no legal system could be held 
accountable for recognising the formal equality of individuals.122 
Hawthorne123 further explains that it "does not take into account the 
discrepancies in resources such as ownership, wealth and knowledge, which 
sustain inequality between the parties to a contract." Consequently, the 
classical model of contract law is not concerned with the respective 
bargaining position of the parties or the resulting unfairness of the bargain.124 
In other words, the socio-economic circumstances of the contracting parties 
are not considered, and there is no duty on the courts to be concerned with 
the promotion of substantive equality and social justice.125 
According to the classical liberal approach, good faith requires that a court 
should give effect to that which is agreed between the parties,126 which will 
ensure commercial and legal certainty. In turn, this forms the basis of a 
formalistic approach to contracts, as the courts need concern themselves 
only with the formal validity and enforceability of the contract as the 
substance of the contract has been agreed upon between the parties and 
must be honoured.127 Consequently, it is argued that substantive fairness 
should not be a ground for setting aside a contract.128 
This model has been the target of increasing attack but with varying 
measures of success. Some of the reasons given for these attacks are 
"rampant inflation, monopolistic practices giving rise to unequal bargaining 
power, and the large-scale use of standard form contracts".129 However, 
these attacks reflect greater changes in the political, economic and social 
environment. The industrial age created great discrepancies in economic 
power that resulted in the exploitation of vulnerable individuals and groups.130 
In South Africa this was further compounded by apartheid, which created 
further political, economic and social inequality.131 These inequalities are 
sustained in part by the existing value system underlying the law of contract, 
because the redistribution of property takes place largely within this 
                                            
122  Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 79.  
123  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 166.  
124  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 165-166. 
125  Hutchison "Nature and Basis of Contract" 24-25; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76; 
Zimmerman Law of Obligations 577.  
126  Bhana and Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
127  Bhana and Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. See further Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76.  
128  Cf the discussion at n 30 above.  
129  Zimmerman "Good Faith and Equity" 575.  
130  Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 80 
131  Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 80.  
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sphere.132 Consequently, the reliance on the common law ideals of freedom 
and sanctity of contract in conjunction with the formalistic and positivistic 
approach by the courts has the effect of sustaining and promoting these 
inequalities.133 This view can be identified in Justice Yacoob's minority 
judgment in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers, as discussed 
above.134 
In Roman law the introduction of the flexible principle of good faith was 
necessary to deal with the influx of foreigners into Rome, who had limited 
access to justice under the Roman ius civile. It was argued that it is possible 
that good faith was introduced by the peregrine praetor to deal with the 
increasing number of foreign traders who played an increasingly important 
role in the Roman economy and development. The situation in South Africa 
is different, but similar themes may be identified. In the colonial period the 
majority of the indigenous people were refused entry into the South African 
economy. With the introduction of the Constitution, everyone was granted 
equal right of access to the economy, but the indigenous people are expected 
to do so in terms of existing laws that are based on common law values that 
sustain and propound the existing inequalities. The incorporation of 
customary values (in particular the concept of ubuntu)135 into the common 
law of contract might prove valuable in addressing these inequalities and the 
move towards a more egalitarian society and a "cohesive, plural, South 
African legal culture".136 It is therefore not surprising that the Constitutional 
Court showed an intention to do exactly this in Everfresh Market Virginia v 
Shoprite Checkers. 
4 The use of open norms to supplement and correct the 
existing law 
4.1 The role of good faith in correcting and supplementing the existing 
ius civile 
Initially, Roman citizens did not enjoy the advantages of the flexible formulary 
procedure that incorporated the principles of good faith and equity.137 As was 
                                            
132  Louw 2013 PELJ 47 speaks of "contracts as [a] private law mechanism for the ordering 
of our social and economic relations". See further Davis and Klare 2010 SAJHR 411. 
133  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 75-79 as supported by Louw 2013 PELJ 58. See also 
Davis and Klare 2010 SAJHR 411. 
134  Cf the discussion at n 28 above. 
135  Louw 2013 PELJ 47. 
136  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 30. Also see Louw 2013 PELJ 
47. 
137  Du Plessis Barkowski's Roman Law 34. 
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seen earlier, the urban praetor's edict was based upon the existing ius civile 
and consequently contained remedies based on the strict and formal legis 
actiones.138 However, it was not long before the new flexible formulary 
procedure was adopted by the urban praetor and incorporated into the ius 
civile.139 Around 150 BC140 the lex Aebutia was passed, in terms of which the 
formulary procedure was made available to Roman citizens.141 With the 
introduction of the flexible formulary procedure and the power to introduce 
new remedies,142 the urban praetor was granted an opportunity to incorporate 
the ius honorarium into the existing Roman ius civile.143 Van Warmelo144 
argues that as time passed the urban praetor exercised this discretion where 
it was necessary to address the changing needs of society and that he looked 
to the ius gentium for guidance in making these changes. This meant that the 
urban praetor introduced remedies where the ius civile did not provide any or 
refused remedies where the ius civile would normally provide relief.145 The 
urban praetor exercised this discretion in accordance with what he 
considered to be right and equitable.146 Therefore, the new remedies 
introduced by the urban praetor were less concerned with the formal and rigid 
requirements of the traditional ius civile and aimed instead at achieving 
fairness and justice between the parties. As with that of the peregrine praetor, 
                                            
138  Cf the discussion at n 69 above. 
139  Du Plessis Barkowski's Roman Law 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law 
para 726; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 253. 
140  The exact date of the lex Aebutia is uncertain (Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman 
Contract Law" 72 n 72; Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 405; De Zulueta Institutes 
of Gaius Part II 250-251). 
141  Du Plessis Barkowski's Roman Law 35; Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman 
Law 199; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 726. As stated by Gaius 
in Inst 4 30: "But all these legis actiones gradually became unpopular. For the 
excessive technicality of the early makers of the law was carried so far that a party 
who made the slightest mistake lost his case. Consequently by the L. Aebutia and the 
two Ll. Iuliae they were abolished, and litigation by means of adapted pleadings, that 
is by formula, was established" (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Para I). 
Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse Reg para 92 and Birks 1969 Irish Jurist 
357 argue that the formulary procedure was already used in cases between Roman 
citizens prior to the enactment of the lex Aebutia. Also see Schiller Roman Law 
Mechanisms 406 for a summary of the different arguments regarding the role of the 
lex Aebutia and Kaser Roman Private Law 395 for a different theory in respect thereof.  
142  Cf the discussion at n 67 above. 
143  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 727; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius 
Part II 18-19. See also the discussion of Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 424-425 
on the nature of the ius honorarium of the urban praetor.  
144  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 33. 
145  Kaser Roman Private Law 19; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law paras 33, 
731; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 253.  
146  Mousourakis Historical Context of Roman Law 199; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
Civil Law para 33. 
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the body of rules developed by the urban praetor was also referred to as the 
ius honorarium.147 
A good example of such a supplementation or correction of the ius civile is 
the case of a contract induced by fraud.148 Initially, a stricti iuris contract 
induced by fraud was valid and binding as long as the formal procedures 
were followed.149 However, fraud was actionable in bonae fidei contracts.150 
The discrepancy between bonae fidei and stricti iuris contracts was 
addressed with the introduction of the defence of fraud (exceptio doli) for the 
stricti iuris contracts in 66 BC.151 Initially, the exceptio doli was limited to 
fraudulent behaviour152 but as time passed the insertion of this defence into 
the formula "provided the judge with the same far-ranging discretion that he 
already had in bonae fidei iudicia."153 Gaius154 illustrates this defence with the 
following example: 
Next we have to consider exceptions. These have been provided for the 
protection of defendants, since it is often the case that, though a man is liable 
at civil law, his condemnation in an action would be inequitable. Thus, if I have 
taken a stipulatory promise from you of a sum of money, on the understanding 
that I will advance you the amount on loan, and then I do not advance it, it is 
undeniable that an action lies against you for the money; for you are legally 
liable to pay it, being bound by the stipulation; but, because it is inequitable that 
you should be condemned on this account, it is settled that you must be 
protected by an exceptio doli mali. 
By introducing these new remedies, the urban praetor (like the peregrine 
praetor)155 was creating new legal rights despite his lack of legislative 
power.156 While his influence was indirect, it was not small: 
                                            
147  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 33.  
148  For further examples see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law paras 731-732; 
Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms 423-427. 
149  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 424. Early Roman law agreements 
were usually concluded by the formal legal act of stipulation (stipulatio or sponsio), 
which is discussed in more detail in Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 12-13. 
150  Watson Law of the Ancient Romans 60. 
151  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 663-664; Watson Law of the Ancient Romans 60. For 
a detailed discussion of the introduction and development of the exceptio doli see 
Zimmerman Law of Obligations 663ff; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law 
paras 698-704.  
152  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 665. 
153  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 667. Also see Kaser Roman Private Law 176. 
154  Gaius Inst 4 115-116a (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part 1). 
155  Cf the discussion at n 86 above. 
156  Kaser Roman Private Law 19; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 34. 
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In this way he managed to change the whole character of Roman law. For all 
practical purposes he created a vast branch of law which extended and 
corrected the existing law, and filled in gaps in it.157 
It could be asked how any praetor could have a vast influence on the existing 
law where he was appointed for one year only and his edict was valid during 
his term of office only.158 Van Warmelo159 explains that as the remedies 
contained in the edict were introduced to address the needs of the 
community, a practice developed whereby the newly appointed praetor would 
incorporate his predecessor's edict into his new edict, subject to the changes 
he regarded as necessary. This resulted in the new praetor's edict looking 
similar to that of his predecessor, and so the edicts looked more similar from 
one year to the next.160  
A further result of these developments was that the flexible formulary 
procedure was preferred over the rigid and formal legis actio procedure, and 
gradually the legis actiones were replaced by the formulary procedure.161 
Finally, in 17 BC the leges Iuliae iudiciorum publicorum et privatorum was 
passed, which abolished the legis actio procedure162 except for certain 
cases.163 As the years passed, the edicts of the urban and peregrine praetor 
became more similar in content.164 This explains why many years later the 
Digest describes the ius honorarium as "that which in the public interest the 
praetors have introduced in aid or supplementation or correction of the jus 
                                            
157  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 33.  
158  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 34. 
159  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 34. See also Kaser Roman Private 
Law 20. 
160  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 34. 
161  Gaius Inst 4 30: "But all these legis actiones gradually became unpopular. For the 
excessive technicality of the early makers of the law was carried so far that a party 
who made the slightest mistake lost his case. Consequently by the L. Aebutia and the 
two Ll. Iuliae they were abolished, and litigation by means of adapted pleadings, that 
is by formulae, was established" (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part 1). 
162  Gaius Inst 4 30 (quoted in n 161 above). Also see Du Plessis Barkowski's Roman Law 
72; Kaser Roman Private Law 396; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law para 
726. 
163  The exceptions were cases falling under the jurisdiction of the centumviral court and 
cases involving damnum infectum (a threat of damage to another's property). Gaius 
Inst 4 31: "In two cases only may one proceed by legis actio, namely for damnum 
infectum and where the trial is to be before the centumviral court" (quoted from De 
Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part 1).  
164  Du Plessis Barkowski's Roman Law 34. Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract 
Law" 67 n 21 explains that the bona fide actions were eventually regarded as part of 
the ius civile. 
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civile."165 Van Warmelo166 points out that as a result of these developments, 
the entire Roman law became more flexible and fair and he argues that this 
created a place for the application of aequitas (fairness) in Roman law. The 
concept of aequitas is discussed in more detail in the next article.167 
4.2 The role of ubuntu in developing the South African common law of 
contract 
4.2.1 The introduction of ubuntu into law 
In the light of the subordinate role of customary laws and values in South 
African history, it was indeed a historical event168 when the concept of ubuntu 
was included in the post-amble of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter the Interim Constitution) under the heading 
"National unity and reconciliation": 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of 
South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated 
gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in 
violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding 
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for 
ubuntu but not for victimisation.169 
From this provision, it is clear that ubuntu was introduced into the official law 
as a restorative tool that could be used to correct the injustices of the past. 
Although the legal role of ubuntu has evolved since then and much has been 
written about this evolution, the link between ubuntu and restorative justice 
runs deep in ubuntu jurisprudence across various areas of law.170 As this 
article deals with the emerging role of ubuntu in the common law of contract, 
the focus will be on the parts of this evolution that shed light upon this specific 
role. 
                                            
165  D 1 1 7 1, Papinian, Definitions, Book 2 (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian). In 
addition, Marcian is quoted in D 1 1 8, Institutes, Book 1 as stating that "the jus 
honorarium itself is the living voice of the jus civile" (quoted from Watson Digest of 
Justinian). Also see Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 65.  
166  Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse Reg para 26. 
167  See Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 6-10. 
168  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 371. 
169  My emphasis.  
170  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 394-408. Also see Bennett, Munro and Jacobs 
Ubuntu 1; Rautenbach 2015 AJICL 279, 294-295. 
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4.2.2 uBuntu as an underlying constitutional value 
After the inclusion of ubuntu in the Interim Constitution, the first reference to 
ubuntu in South African jurisprudence was in S v Makwanyane, which deals 
with the constitutionality of the death penalty.171 Himonga et al.172 argue that 
the developments of ubuntu in later jurisprudence can be traced back to the 
remarks in this judgment and therefore it is the best place to start the 
discussion. The Court referred to the post-amble of the Interim Constitution 
and the idea that the Interim Constitution should be interpreted according to 
the specific historical background of South Africa and in line with the ideals 
of ubuntu.173 Himonga et al.174 further contend that the remarks by Justices 
Madala and Mokgoro indicate that they view ubuntu as a constitutional value 
that should be used in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Specifically, 
Justice Madala175 stated that ubuntu "permeates the [Interim] Constitution 
generally and more particularly chap 3, which embodies the entrenched 
fundamental human rights." Justice Mokgoro176 held that under the new 
constitutional order legislative interpretation would be "radically" different 
from that under apartheid. She argued that post-apartheid legislative 
interpretation must be value-based and she envisaged that ubuntu could play 
an important role in this task:  
In interpreting the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as already 
mentioned, an all-inclusive value system, or common values in South Africa, 
can form a basis upon which to develop a South African human rights 
jurisprudence. Although South Africans have a history of deep divisions 
characterised by strife and conflict, one shared value and ideal that runs like a 
golden thread across cultural lines is the value of ubuntu – a notion now coming 
to be generally articulated in this country.177 
Justice Mokgoro thus regards ubuntu as a shared value that could be used 
to develop a new legal culture that incorporates a normative approach to 
constitutional interpretation.178 In other words, ubuntu as an underlying 
                                            
171  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) (hereafter S v Makwanyane). 
172  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 376. 
173  Especially S v Makwanyane para 263 (Justice Mahomed), but also paras 130-131 
(Justice Chaskalson); 223-227 (Justice Langa); 237 (Justice Madala); 307-308 
(Justice Mokgoro); 374 n 231 (Justice Sachs). 
174  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 377-378. 
175  S v Makwanyane para 237.  
176  S v Makwanyane para 301. Her description of legislative interpretation under apartheid 
coincides with that discussed earlier at n 109 above: "In that legal order, due to the 
sovereignty of Parliament, the supremacy of legislation and the absence of judicial 
review of parliamentary statutes, courts engaged in simple statutory interpretation, 
giving effect to the clear and unambiguous language of the legislative text, no matter 
how unjust the legislative provision." 
177  S v Makwanyane para 302. 
178  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 34. 
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constitutional value should be used as an open norm in constitutional 
interpretation with the object of promoting justice.179  
Although ubuntu is not mentioned in the final Constitution, it has remained 
part of South Africa's constitutional jurisprudence, as is evidenced by a 
number of Constitutional Court judgments.180 For the purposes of this section, 
it is necessary to mention Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, in 
which Justice Sachs confirmed the status of ubuntu as an underlying value 
in the final Constitution.181 
4.2.3 uBuntu's role in the development of the common law of contract: 
transformative constitutionalism 
The term "transformative constitutionalism" was coined by Klare182 in his 
seminal article entitled "Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism". 
Supporting Justice Mokgoro's view that a constitutional interpretation would 
require a value-based approach, he argued that the Constitution requires an 
interpretation that takes into account the relevant historical and political 
context of South Africa. He further argued that there is a movement away 
from liberalism toward a social democracy or what he calls "an 'empowered' 
model of democracy".183 He defined "transformative constitutionalism" as 
follows: 
[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of 
conducive political developments) to transforming a country's political and 
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of 
inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes 
grounded in law.184  
He further argued that such an interpretation would not undermine the 
principles of legal constraint and the rule of law as they would be  
practices of constitutional interpretation that acknowledge and fulfil the duty of 
interpretive fidelity and yet that are engaged with and committed to 
                                            
179  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 389 referred to with approval by Rautenbach 
2015 AJICL 291. Also see Rautenbach "Exploring the Contribution of Ubuntu" 294. 
Bennett, Munro and Jacobs Ubuntu 61 describes ubuntu as a "metanorm" which is 
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180  For a collection of extracts from some of these judgments see Cornell and Muvangua 
uBuntu and the Law.  
181  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37 
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182  Klare 1998 SAJHR 146-188. 
183  Klare 1998 SAJHR 152. 
184  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150. 
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'establish[ing] a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights,' a society that will '[i]mprove the quality of life of all 
citizens and free the potential of each person.185 
Although he accepted that the Constitution aims to protect individual rights 
and freedoms, he contended that it is also committed to egalitarian social 
transformation in the private sphere.186 Therefore, the Constitution should be 
interpreted in such a way as to achieve egalitarian social transformation in 
the private sphere,187 and "to lay the legal foundations of a just, democratic, 
and egalitarian social order".188 There are various sections in the Constitution 
that would support such an interpretation. Specifically, section 1(a) provides 
that the Republic of South Africa is founded on the values of "human dignity, 
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms".189 Klare190 argued that the use of the word "achievement" read 
with the right to equality as "the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms"191 indicates a commitment to substantive equality. Klare further 
accepted that such a normative interpretation would be informed by the 
concept of ubuntu as part of the underlying value system of the 
Constitution.192  
In the context of contract law, Hawthorne193 refers to section 39(2) of the 
Constitution, which obliges the court to promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law. She also refers to 
section 173 of the Constitution, which grants the court an inherent power to 
develop the common law by taking into account the interests of justice.194 
She argues that these provisions require a purposive interpretation that 
incorporates the interpretation of open norms like good faith.195 As such, she 
argues that good faith should be used as a tool to promote substantive 
equality between contractual parties in line with the values and aims of the 
Constitution.196 In this sense, substantive equality would not refer to formal 
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193  Hawthorne 2003 THRHR 117. Also see Louw 2013 PELJ 67; Hawthorne 2006 
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equality before the law only (as promoted by the classical liberal model of 
contract law and the rule of law), but that the law should also take into account 
the inequalities in the social and economic position of the parties.197 
Therefore, she argues for a movement away from the classical model of 
contract law that is based on formal equality, does not take account of 
substantive fairness between the parties, and thus limits the role of good faith, 
towards a normative and value-based approach that would allow the courts 
to take cognisance of the social and economic reality in which the contract is 
concluded and to interfere with the contractual relationship in order to achieve 
substantive equality and justice between the parties.198  
After the status of ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value of the final 
Constitution was confirmed in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers,199 Davis and Klare200 argued that section 39(2) obliges the courts 
to "re-imagine all law in the spirit of ubuntu". Bennett201 further explains that 
ubuntu has been and can be used by the courts to "modify the effect of strict 
application of the law". It is therefore unsurprising that the Constitutional 
Court in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers stressed that the 
common law of contract, and especially the concept of good faith, must be 
informed by the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu.202 Although the 
Court failed to make any mention of ubuntu in Botha v Rich, it followed a 
similar approach. The Court referred to the transformative ideals of the 
Constitution203 and the constitutional values of human dignity and equality204 
to develop the principle of good faith into a flexible principle that can be used 
to temper the rigid application of contract law rules and doctrines where it 
would lead to injustice.205 This is similar to the role of good faith in Roman 
law, which was discussed above. It was shown how the introduction of good 
faith into Roman law caused subsequent developments in the existing ius 
civile. The urban praetor acquired the right to correct or supplement the 
formal and rigid ius civile in accordance with what was considered fair and 
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equitable. In other words, good faith was used as an open norm when 
interpreting and applying the the ius civile. In Botha v Rich the Court 
specifically referred to this historical role of good faith:  
To the extent that the rigid application of the principle of reciprocity may in 
particular circumstances lead to injustice, our law of contract, based as it is on 
the principle of good faith, contains the necessary flexibility to ensure fairness. 
In Tuckers Land Development Corporation it was pointed out that the concepts 
of justice, reasonableness and fairness historically constituted good faith in 
contract.206  
Therefore, the Court relied on good faith to incorporate a normative and more 
flexible approach into the law of contract and did so in a way that aligned with 
the transformative ideals of the Constitution. For this reason it is unfortunate 
that the Court did not refer to the constitutional value of ubuntu. Nevertheless, 
in the next article I argue that the Court was doing nothing less than 
developing the principle of good faith in accordance with the underlying 
constitutional value of ubuntu.207 
5 Conclusion 
In this article it has been shown how the Romans realised that their existing 
formal and rigid laws could not address the changing legal needs of the 
community due to the influx of foreigners (especially foreign traders) into 
Rome. In reaction to the changing commercial environment, they introduced 
flexible legal procedures and a more normative approach to these legal 
transactions to achieve fairness and justice between the contracting parties. 
This worked so well that the new flexible procedures and normative principles 
were transferred to the existing formalistic law. Gradually, the existing ius 
civile became subject to a more normative interpretation in the interests of 
justice through the use of the open norm of good faith. It has been argued 
that in a similar way, ubuntu can be used to address legal pluralism in the 
South African legal system, and its application as an underlying constitutional 
value could result in the better use of the open norm of good faith in the 
common law of contract to address contractual unfairness. In the next article, 
two further themes are explored to construct an even more contextual legal 
history of good faith in Roman contract law and then to compare this history 
with the emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract.  
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